UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-5-2017

State v. Tollman Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44648

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Tollman Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44648" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6554.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6554

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
NO. 44648
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2012-17869
v.
)
)
TERESA LEE TOLLMAN,
)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)
________________________

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE MELISSA MOODY
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #6555
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................................. 4
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 5
The District Court Had Discretion To Grant Ms. Tollman’s
Application For A Restricted Driver’s License ............................................................ 5
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 8
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ........................................................................................... 9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307 (2002) ........................................................... 6
Floyd v. Bd. of Com’rs of Bonneville County, 131 Idaho 234 (1998) ............................... 6
State v. Hansen, 130 Idaho 845 (Ct. App. 1997)............................................................. 5
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598 (1989) ........................................................................... 5
State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41 (2011) ....................................................................... 7, 8
State v. Lamb, 147 Idaho 133 (Ct. App. 2009) ................................................................ 8
State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406 (Ct. App. 1999) ......................................................... 8
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863 (2011) ............................................................................ 5
Univ. of Utah Hosp. on behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172 (1982) ........................ 7
Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874 (Ct. App. 2000) .......................................................... 7, 8

Statutes
I.C. § 18-8005 ........................................................................................................passim

Additional Authorities
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 60 ....................................................................................... 6

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Teresa Tollman contends the district court erred when it denied her application
for a restricted driver’s license. She asserts that, although the district court stated it
would like to grant Ms. Tollman’s request, the district court mistakenly concluded it did
not have authority to do so. A proper application of Idaho decisional law to the relevant
statute reveals that the district court did, in fact, have authority to grant Ms. Tollman’s
request under the 2015 amendment to that statute. Since the district court failed to
appreciate the outer bounds of its discretion in that regard, this Court should reverse the
order denying Ms. Tollman’s application for a restricted driver’s license and remand this
case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Tollman pled guilty to felony driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI)
and, on March 1, 2013, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with
two and one-half years fixed. (Supp. R., pp.35-36.)1 As part of that sentence, the
district court ordered Ms. Tollman’s driver’s license “be absolutely suspended for five (5)
years, to commence upon the date of the defendant’s [release from custody].”
(Supp. R., p.36; see R., p.16.) On March 16, 2016, Ms. Tollman filed an application
requesting a restricted driver’s license. (R., p.10.) The district court concluded that
I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d) requires at least one year of absolute suspension of driving

1

This Court augmented the appellate record in this case with the record prepared in
Docket No. 40907 (Ms. Tollman’s prior appeal challenging the imposition of sentence
and the denial of her I.C.R. 35 motion for leniency). References to the record from the
prior appeal will be identified as “Supp.”
1

privileges, and “[i]t is the burden of the movant (here, the Defendant) to show that that
year has elapsed and the Defendant is eligible for restricted privileges.” (R., pp.17-18.)
However, “[t]he Defendant has provided no proof that she is eligible for restricted
privileges,” and so, the district court denied her application for the restricted license at
that time. (R., p.18.)
Based on that order, Ms. Tollman waited until she had completed her first year of
release before she renewed her application for a restricted driver’s license on
September 12, 2016.

(R., p.24.)

She attached an “Offender Profile” from the

Department of Correction to that application which documented the fact that she had
been released on parole on August 4, 2015. (R., p.26.) In a letter accompanying that
application, Ms. Tollman explained the request was based on, for example, the fact that
her transportation costs associated with her work were becoming overly-burdensome.
(R., pp.21-22.)

Additionally, the Department of Correction sent a Special Progress

Report to the district court confirming that Ms. Tollman was complying with the terms of
her parole, and that she had been a contributing member of society during her release.
(R., pp.32-33.) In that report, her parole officer stated that Ms. Tollman “has fulfilled all
the requirements of her supervision necessary to make this request” for a restricted
driver’s license. (R., p.34.)
The district court indicated that, based on Ms. Tollman’s performance on parole,
it would normally be willing to grant the request for a restricted license. (Tr., p.11,
Ls.2-4.) However, the district court determined it did not have the authority to do so in
Ms. Tollman’s case. (Tr., p.6, Ls.6-13.) The district court explained that, originally, the
relevant statue – I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d) – provided the district court should suspend a
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person’s driving privileges “for a mandatory minimum period of one (1) year after
release from imprisonment, and may have his driving privileges suspended by the court
for not to exceed five (5) years after release from imprisonment, during which time, he
shall have absolutely no driving privilege of any kind.” (R., p.17.) However, that statute
had been amended in 2015 to clarify that, during the first year, there was to be an
absolute suspension of privileges, but that the defendant “may have his driving
privileges suspended by the court for an additional period not to exceed four (4) years,
during which the defendant may request restricted driving privileges . . . .” (R., p.17.)
The district court determined that, since the order suspending Ms. Tollman’s driving
privileges had been entered prior to the 2015 amendment, the pre-2015 version of the
statute controlled Ms. Tollman’s request, and, since (unlike the amended version) the
pre-2015 version of the statute only provided for an absolute suspension of privileges,
the district court concluded it did not have authority to grant Ms. Tollman’s request for
restricted driving privileges. (See Tr., p.8, Ls.1-19.)
However, the district court also encouraged Ms. Tollman to consider appealing
its ruling. (See Tr., p.8, Ls.4-16.) Ms. Tollman did so, as she ultimately filed a Notice of
Appeal timely from the order denying her most recent application for a restricted driver’s
license. (R., pp.36, 40.)

3

ISSUE
Whether the district court had discretion to grant Ms. Tollman’s application for a
restricted driver’s license.

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Had Discretion To Grant Ms. Tollman’s Application For A Restricted
Driver’s License
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law which the appellate courts review
de novo. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011). Additionally, when reviewing a
discretionary decision, the appellate courts assess whether the lower court perceived
the issue as one of discretion, whether it acted within the outer boundaries of that
discretion, and whether it reached that decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). As a result, “when a trial court has unduly
narrowed the scope of its discretion through a misapprehension of applicable law, the
proper course is for the appellate court to remand the case so that the trial court can
make the discretionary decision anew, in light of the proper legal standards governing
the decision.” State v. Hansen, 130 Idaho 845, 848 (Ct. App. 1997). Since the district
court failed to recognize that the 2015 amendment to I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d) controls the
analysis of Ms. Tollman’s application for a restricted driver’s license, and that it could,
therefore, grant her request under that amendment, the district court’s resulting decision
to deny the requested relief constituted an abuse of its discretion.
Prior to the 2015 amendment, at the time Ms. Tollman’s license was originally
suspended (see Supp. R., p.35), the statute provided that, when the defendant has
been convicted of felony DUI, the defendant:
Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for a mandatory
minimum period of one (1) year after release from imprisonment, and may
have his driving privileges suspended by the court for not to exceed five
(5) years after release from imprisonment, during which time he shall have
absolutely no driving privileges of any kind.

5

See 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 60 (amendment indications omitted).

The 2015

amendment, which was in effect at the time Ms. Tollman made her requests for
restricted driving privileges (see R., p.24), clarified that when the defendant has been
convicted of felony DUI, the defendant:
Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court of a mandatory
minimum period of one (1) year after release from imprisonment,
during which time he shall have absolutely no driving privileges of any
kind, and may have his driving privileges suspended by the court of
an additional period not to exceed four (4) years, during which the
defendant may request restricted driving privileges that the court may
allow if the defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that
driving privileges are necessary for his employment or for family health
needs . . . .
Id. (amendment indications omitted).
A proper application of Idaho decisional law reveals that, contrary to the district
court’s conclusion, the 2015 amendment to I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d) controls the analysis of
Ms. Tollman’s application for a restricted driver’s license. While retroactive application
of statutes is generally discouraged, “[a] statute is not made retroactive merely because
it draws upon facts antecedent to its enactment. Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho
307, 313 (2002). For example, amendments which are remedial or procedural in nature
should control the analysis of an ensuing action even if the amendments are enacted
after the events in question because “the effect of such statutes is actually prospective
in nature since they relate to the procedure to be followed in the future.” Id.; accord
Floyd v. Bd. of Com’rs of Bonneville County, 131 Idaho 234, 238 (1998) (“remedial and
procedural statutes should be applied retroactively.”).

Basically, in those type of

situations, the change in the law applies to ensuing decisions irrespective of what the
result might have been under a previous version of the statute.
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See, e.g.,

State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 43-46 (2011) (holding that the defendant’s request for
an exemption from the sex offender registration requirements was governed by an
amendment to the relevant statute which prohibited such an exemption, even though
that amendment had not been enacted until after the defendant had completed his
probation and his conviction had been dismissed); Univ. of Utah Hosp. on behalf of
Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 174 (1982) (“From [the date of the amendment] forward
the appellant had fair notice of the new requirements of when an application [for relief]
had to be filed . . .”).
In fact, this rationale has been applied to amendments to other provisions of
I.C. § 18-8005 itself, namely, the provisions governing enhancing certain violations of
the statute to felonies based on repeated violations of the statute. Thus, when the
Legislature increased the time in which the State could look back to find prior offenses
upon which to base such an enhancement, and that amendment came into effect
between the time a defendant was convicted of the prior offense and the time he
committed the new offense, it was still the defendant’s “own behavior that resulted in his
1995 DUI charge and caused the updated I.C. § 18-8005(7) to have an effect on the
length of his sentence.

Had [the defendant] not again chosen to drive under the

influence, his prior DUIs would be irrelevant.” Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 879-80
(Ct. App. 2000). In that case, the amended version of the statute controlled the analysis
because that was the law at the time of the new cause of action, regardless of what the
law might have allowed or required at the time of his prior conviction. See id. Since
such amendments operate in that prospective manner, such amendments, including
several to I.C. § 18-8005, have been repeatedly held to not violate the constitutional
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protections in regard to due process or ex post facto laws. See, e.g., Johnson, 152
Idaho at 44-47; State v. Lamb, 147 Idaho 133, 135 (Ct. App. 2009); Wilson, 133 Idaho
at 879-80; State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 411-12 (Ct. App. 1999).
The 2015 amendment to I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d) operates in the same, prospective
manner. It clarifies the procedure for the district court to follow when assessing new
applications for restricted driving privileges, defining the remedy the district court is
authorized to give in response to a satisfactory application for relief. Therefore, since
the 2015 amendment prospectively defined the district court’s authority in regard to
requests for relief made after it was enacted, and Ms. Tollman made her request for
restricted driving privileges more than a year after the 2015 amendment took effect, the
district court had authority to grant Ms. Tollman’s request for relief under the amended
version of I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d).
Ergo, the district court failed to appreciate the outer bounds of its discretion, and
so, its decision to deny Ms. Tollman relief should be reversed as an abuse of its
discretion. Rather, it should have granted the relief it declared it was otherwise inclined
to give based on Ms. Tollman’s satisfactory performance on parole. (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4.)

CONCLUSION
Ms. Tollman respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying her
application for a restricted driver’s license and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2017.
_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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